Study on Adaptive Management Model and Key Factors under Extended Producer Responsibility by Zhao Yiping & Oya Jun
136
?? ????????????
With rapid industrialization, modernization and 
urbanization, billion tons of wastes including used and 
discarded products are produced every year worldwide. 
These wastes not only deteriorate the already seriously 
polluted environment but also make numerable useful 
resources dumped to “wrong places”, the landfills. As a 
result, natural resource exhaustion and environmental 
pollutions are deteriorated to be major obstacles for 
sustainable development. Based on practical experiences of 
waste management and cleaner production promotions, T. 
Lindhqvist initially raised the concept of extended producer 
responsibility (EPR) in 1988 [1], which proves to be an 
effective policy principle to motivate effective solutions for 
“end-of-pipe” problems.
In the past two decades, EPR has drawn nearly 20 
countries’ wide attentions, and has been applied in the solid 
waste management of about 20 industries. EU members, 
Japan [2] and other countries have established relatively 
mutual EPR system of mandatory programs. Countries that 
characterized by voluntary agreement, such as United States 
and Canada, have also embarked on the study of EPR 
policies and regulations, and started the transferring process 
from voluntary agreements to more mandatory regulations 
management. Those countries who have not yet established 
a system for EPR policies and regulations are also actively 
exploring the formulation of relevant laws and specific 
implementation plan. For example, from 2004 China has 
begun to explore the application of EPR principles in the 
field of waste management, especially in the electronics and 
automobile industries. EPR principles have been 
incorporated in the “Solid Waste Law” and “Circular 
Economic Law”. Throughout the world, EPR presents its 
different characteristics in different countries, different 
industries and different periods of time, as well as the 
diversity of applications.
However, as in its infancy, the implementation of EPR 
is also facing various problems. One of the most important 
problems is the participation of single company. T. 
Lindhqvist [3] indicates that individual company’s active 
participation to achieve product life-cycle improvement is 
critically important for successful EPR implementation. 
And product life-cycle system is complicatedly composed 
by var ious s takeholders in the dynamic market 
environment. Unfortunately, recycling-related knowledge 
and fast system learning capabilities processed by producers 
are mostly limited. As a result, a number of companies 
behave passively, which highly hinders the implementation 
of EPR programs. “Free rider” is one of the most 
undesirable phenomena during EPR’s implementation, 
which has been always drawing attention since the 
beginning stage that EPR was introduced [4]. In general, 
the difficulties for companies taking their responsibilities 
are concluded as the following aspects: (1) the financial 
deficiency; (2) the lack of technological solutions [5][6]; (3) 
unnatural development of the related supply chain system 
[6]; (4) difficulty in finding an efficient and effective 
method for collecting their own products [7]; and (5) less 
scale economy of the returning wastes to be recycled.
It is concluded in our previous research that, the 
greatest challenges that EPR brings to the responsible 
companies is the physical and economic responsibilities, 
which are extended beyond the original scope of 
enterprises’ business. The extended responsibilities require 
the enterprises not only adjust the existing supply system, 
but also integrate the recycling practice with the production 
process. From the management perspective, this involves 
plenty of unknown knowledge for the enterprises, and 
increases the uncertainty of management. Just because the 
involved life-cycle stakeholder system is diverse, complex 
and dynamic, the enterprises must re-examine the system in 
question from a new perspective to better understand the 
new scenario. In other words, to investigate the challenges 
that responsible companies are facing under EPR with 
systematic framework, and to study the beneficial 
responsive strategies from integrated and dynamic view-
points is of great practical significance for responsible 
companies as well as for the smooth implementation of 
EPR.
As important as the problem is, few in-depth studies or 
effective solutions have been intended or provided to 
enhance individual company’s actively responding 
capabilities from more systematic and integrated life-cycle 
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viewpoints yet [5]. Based on adaptive management theory 
we analyze the functioning mechanism of EPR especially 
producer’s responsive reactions within a life-cycle 
stakeholder system. Then the key influencing factors in 
terms of adaptive decision-making for key stakeholders are 
studied based on game theory. Suggestions are made for 
both producer and government as well.
?? ?????????????????????????????????????
Adap t ive managemen t (AM) i s i nnova t ive 
environmental assessment and management idea which 
could be traced back to 1970s when it was developed by 
C.S. Holling [8]. Distinctive from traditional management 
method which takes management intervenes as pure 
solutions to the environmental problem in question, AM 
seeks aggressive use of management intervenes to probe 
and learn about the functioning of objective ecological 
system. Due to the fact of managers’ ignorance and the 
limit of people’s learning abilities at a certain period, AM is 
considered to be an effective model for dynamic system 
management which is highly complicated with plenty of 
uncertainties. Instead of statistic management scheme, a 
continuous learning and improving process is intended to 
achieve through AM.
As discussed above, EPR’s implementation not only 
changes the original supply chain system, but also 
introduces new stakeholders to formulate a new and more 
complicated stakeholder system. As shown in Fig.1, our 
proposed life-cycle stakeholder system under EPR includes 
six stakeholders: the upstream suppliers, producers, 
distributors and retailers, consumers, collectors and 
recyclers and government. According to the definition of 
EPR, the producer here refers to the core manufacturers or 
importers of certain products or certain brand of products. 
This is due to the fact that within a supply chain, there is 
normally a “central” manufacturer who assembles the 
finished goods or owns the brand of the products. In 
addition, with the development of international trade, the 
scope of “producer” in EPR is also expanded to not only 
the core manufacturers but also importers [3]. The upstream 
suppliers provide the components, materials or semi-
completed goods. In this case, this manufacturer possesses 
the actual decisive power or controllability over the product 
design and material/component adopting standards. In other 
words, it has the controlling power over the operation of the 
whole supply system such as the car manufacturer. 
Therefore, it is taken as the core entity in both supply chain 
management and environmental supply chain management 
[9]. In EPR, the end-of-life responsibilities are also 
supposed to be extended to this producer so as to both 
economic and ecological pressures caused by the discarded 
products could be effectively transferred back to the 
production system.
As implementing EPR, the government intervenes in 
the market in a comprehensive way. As shown by the 
double-line arrows in Fig.1, government directly assigns 
full or major end-of-life responsibilities to producers, and 
sets new requirements to retailers, customers and recyclers 
etc through policies or regulations. As a result, some new 
relationships occur among the other stakeholders. As shown 
by double-line dashed arrows in Fig.1, in response to the 
collecting-related requirements, end users are supposed to 
return their used products through the collecting system to 
the recyclers. In response to the recycling-related 
requirements, suppliers are also involved to make the 
design improvement to increase product’s recyclability. 
Besides, third-party organizations are found to serve 
financial, physical or informative responsibilities. Except to 
the above direct relationships, some of the newly emerged 
mutual influences are indirect but also significant, as shown 
by dashed arrows in Fig.1. For example, the customer’s 
behaviors highly influence the producer’s performance of 
soundly taking the extended responsibilities as the same as 
the recyclers. The R&D capabilities of the suppliers affect 
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the performance of design improving and indirectly 
influence the recycling performance. This complexity could 
impliedly explain why a government is very slow in 
carrying out a new or higher environmental requirement 
sometimes.
Actually, the mutual relationships and interactions 
among the life-cycle stakeholders under EPR in reality are 
even more complicated than the above explanation. For 
example, in different countries the government could be 
further divided into the central government and 
municipalities, as in federal regime as the US. Thus division 
and distinguishing in some sense can be infinitely 
continued. Thus in order to simplify the system as well as 
the relationships inside, we set up the theoretical framework 
with only key interrelationships being focused as shown in 
Fig.1.
Within the life-cycle stakeholder system the 
stakeholders are complicatedly interrelated to each other. 
Meanwhile, each stakeholder will react differently 
according to a certain responsive strategy carried out by the 
producer against EPR. These reactions will keep changing 
with the development of economy, technology or other 
conditions; and will affect the outcome of producer’s 
strategies in return. Since produce is unfamiliar with the 
interaction knowledge and the influences, rather than 
providing a statistic management solution to EPR for 
producer through traditional management ideas, continuous 
monitoring, understanding and adapting by producer are 
more deeply and practically needed. Therefore, AM is 
introduced in this research to facilitate producer’s effective 
response to EPR as shown in Fig.2.
Briefly speaking, producers or responsible companies 
will start the management process with potentially effective 
measures to respond to EPR programs based on their 
existing knowledge and assumption about the situation and 
f ea tu re s o f t he new s t akeho lde r s sys t em, and 
interrelationships among various parties, as shown by the 
“Key factor” in upper-left, grey-background square in 
Fig.2. Both the “implementation” process of the initial 
measures and the consequent “output result” will be 
“monitored”, including the reacting and mutual influencing 
process among various stakeholders. All the key factors will 
also be informed to and the ideas be exchanged with the 
other stakeholders. Together with the monitoring result, the 
“Key factors” will be re-evaluated to facilitate the producer 
better understanding the newly emerged environment and 
be adjusted to compose the producer’s new knowledge as 
shown by the black square in Fig.2. With the improved 
understanding of the key factors and the combined action 
by the other stakeholders, the producer’s comprehension 
about effective EPR management measures will be 
advanced, which then contributes to the producer’s new 
knowledge for another round of “probing and learning” 
management process. In general, the AM process mainly 
includes four steps, the first of which is shown in the upper 
part of Fig.2 and the last three are shown in the lowest area 
of Fig.2: (1) to implement responsive measures based on 
current understanding of the key factors; (2) to monitor the 
results and make self-evaluation by responsible companies; 
(3) to assess the stakeholder system, and (4) to identify 
opportunity and challenge so as to improve the 
management. The kernel of this AM process is that the 
producer’s comprehension about the changing environment 
and their identification of key factors will be continuously 
advanced, which results in that their management 
capabilities in response to EPR will be continuously 
improved along with the development of various internal 
and external conditions.
One of the crucial steps to realize the above adaptive 
management is to identify the “Key factors”. Therefore on 
the basis of the proposed adaptive management framework 
and life-cycle stakeholder system, this research will further 
focused on the analysis of the stakeholders and to identify 
key factors for this system to reach the goal of providing 
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fundamental references for adaptive management initiation.
?? ???????????????
???? ?????????????????????????????
As a concept used in corporate administration or 
project management, stakeholder is viewed as any person 
or organization that can be positively or negatively 
impacted by, or cause an impact on the actions of a 
company. In order to clarify the consequences of envisaged 
changes, or at the start of new projects and in connection 
with organizational changes generally, analysis needs to be 
carried out to all the stakeholders including the primary 
stakeholders, secondary stakeholders and more significantly 
those identified as the “KEY” stakeholders. Different 
method of stakeholder mapping are developed for different 
analytical aims and system situations. In this section, 
stakeholder analysis is carried out with three aims: (1) to 
analyze each stakeholder’s features and major influences on 
the producer; and (2) to identify the “KEY stakeholders” 
and important interaction during the implementation and 
strategy-making of EPR. Therefore, based on the theory of 
stakeholder analysis, we adopt a three dimensional 
framework, including attitude, power and interest. Attitude 
describes the manner that a stakeholder is related to EPR 
program as well as major functions it has during the whole 
process. In this dimension, discussion will be focused on 
whether a stakeholder is an active influencer or passive 
influencee for the producer’s responsive strategies. Power 
describes strengthens of the influence that a stakeholder has 
on the design and results of the manufacture’s strategy. 
Whether a stakeholder could strongly influence the 
producer’s strategy making, and the potential outcome as 
well, will be judged in this dimension. Interest describes the 
extent to which a stakeholder is willing to get involved and 
informed. With the understanding of whether higher or 
lower involvement and informing level more acceptable for 
a certain stakeholder, suitable management measures for 
each stakeholder will be identified. Three types of key 
stakeholders are intended to be identified. The active 
influencers with strong power and higher interest are 
primary key stakeholders. The passive influencees with 
strong power and higher interest are secondary key 
stakeholder. The passive influencees with strong power but 
lower interest are also key stakeholders who need special 
incentives to keep them playing positively cooperative 
roles.
???? ?????????????????????????????????
According to the above three dimensional analytical 
framework, five stakeholders will be analyzed, including 
government, suppliers, distributors and retailers, customers, 
and recyclers.
??????????????????
Government is the only active initiator of EPR 
programs. With the increasing environmental problems 
caused by end-of-life products and growing resource 
detraction pressures, more and more government are 
implementing EPR to assign producers with responsibility 
of product life-cycle environmental management, especially 
the post-consumption wastes. As the government starts 
conceiving to adopt EPR, the producer will firstly get 
involved into the process of dialogue. As for the other 
stakeholders such as customers, recyclers, suppliers and so 
on, are involved after a real EPR program is implemented. 
In other words, both producer and the other stakeholders 
except government will be passively influenced by EPR. 
However, the introduction and implementation of EPR is 
quite an interactive process, where dialogue and negotiation 
between government and major producers could be several-
year long before a specific EPR program is finally 
introduced to an industry. During this process, producers’ 
awareness is educated and economic system gets time to 
make necessary preparation before the regulation gets 
through. On the other hand, status and willingness of the 
whole economic system greatly influence the process 
resulting in some voluntary programs and even no EPR at 
all. In other words, how an EPR program is designed and 
implemented is resulting from the balance between the 
environmental problems managed by government, and the 
status as well as the capabilities contained by the economic 
system. In some special cases, producers will actively 
engage into the end-of-life products recycling and managing 
driven by attractive economic benefits. For example, Ford 
GM and Chrysler co-founded an R&D center to increase 
the recyclability of automobiles in Detroit. Ford also 
merged some recycling companies in Europe.
???????????????
The government has stronger power or influence in 
terms of advocating the idea of EPR and initiating its 
development as well. Furthermore, the power of the 
government for an EPR program depends on whether a 
mandatory or voluntary program is applied. As the 
worldwide acknowledged successful models of EPR 
implementation, Europe and Japan have adopted mandatory 
EPR programs through related legislations. In this case, 
government has the strongest power. Recyclers also have 
strong power since the technological capabilities and 
operating performances significantly affect the realization 
of the final recycling performances both ecologically and 
economically. Thus as producers making their responsive 
strategies, they must take the current recycling level and 
potential improvement possibilities into consideration, 
where some of the questions are not technological but 
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political and managerial. A side-effect worthwhile to 
mention here is that a disordered recycling market could be 
a big hindering factor for EPR implementation, even if 
sounder eco-design and recycling technologies are ready 
for the market. Another stakeholder with strong power is 
suppliers because almost all the design improvement 
practices need participation and cooperation of the 
suppliers. R&D ability of suppliers and the possibility of 
changing new suppliers are consequently a decisive factor 
of the source design improvement by producers not only in 
terms of R&D competency but also the economic issues. 
Roles supposed to be played by the customers and 
distributors are important but not so strong, since a certain 
economic incentives and institutional arrangement will 
soundly ensure the involvement distributing system and 
customers. Comparatively, secondary market for used 
products is an important factor though an external factor as 
well. Discussions on this issue is very significant for some 
economies but beyond the scope of this research.
??????????????????
Government has the highest interest toward EPR 
programs. Beside the design of an EPR program at the 
starting stage, the government also considers how it is 
monitored and improved during the implementation process. 
Recyclers could be interested if well informed of the details 
of product structure, component and materials adopted 
would contribute to higher recycling performance and 
earning. On the contrary, suppliers are always lack of 
interest in EPR programs as extra costs will be caused, 
though suppliers have also strong power. The supply-
demand incentives will drive the suppliers to cooperate. The 
public with higher environmental awareness and 
environmental NGOs also have higher interest in the 
process of EPR and the strategies taken by the producer, or 
the green image. It has contributed to a driving factor for 
company’s environmentally friendly actions in for example 
Europe and Japan etc. Features of each life-cycle 
stakeholder under an EPR program are summarized as Table 
1. By summarizing the above analysis, government is the 
most important stakeholder in EPR program. Interaction 
between government and the producer is significant so that 
game model will be developed in next constraining 
conditions for producers’ trade-offs economically. 
Meanwhile, information needs to be passed to customers, 
suppliers, recyclers and third-party organizations, vise verse.
?? ????????????????????
???? ???????????????????????????????
Game theory is considered as one of most effective 
research methods for strategic decision making analysis. 
From the stakeholder analysis in the previous section, the 
producer and government are the two significant players 
that involved in the game analysis. In order to achieve 
reasonable simplification, the following analysis is based 
on one assumption that the player “government” includes 
administration departments of all level, who has the 
authority to make and the power to enforce regulations, or 
rules. The other assumption is that the player “producers” 
refers to the manufacturers and importers who have the 
decisive power on the product design and material/
component adoption.
In terms of the government’s side, we suppose the cost 
of implementing EPR program includes: administration 
cost for running the EPR program, “a”; the expenses for 
monitoring the environmental performance achieved by the 
producer, “mo”. When adopting commendatory program, 
the government will penalize “p” on the producers who are 
found regulation violation. On the other hand, under EPR 
programs well performed producers will undertake the 
extended responsibilities of recycling the end-of-pipe 
products and of re-designing their products for better 
environmental performance. This will contribute to the 
increase of recycling level of end-of-life products and to the 
decrease of the toxicity and increase of recyclability of the 
ecologically designed products respectively. As the 
representative of social public interest, the government will 
benefit from the enhanced ecological performance or the 
reduced negative ecological impacts achieved above, er and 
ed. In Specific, “er” stands for the ecological benefits 
resulting from improved environmental performance of 
recycling, and “ed” stands for the ecological benefits 
resulting from improved environmental performance of 
product design or eco-design. Calculation of er and ed can 
be achieved by following the methods of Life Cycle 
Assessment or by utilizing the software of Eco-Indicator 99 
etc [10].
In terms of the producers’ side, those who implement 
recycling and collecting have to arrange the corresponding 
cost, “rc”. In case that the producer not only implements 
recycling but is also self-motivated to carry out eco-design 
of new products, an extra expense “d” should be arranged 
from the producer side. While, producer may have potential 
benefit “mr” from recycling due to such facts as elevated 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????
Attitude Power Interest
Government Active Strong High
Recycler Passive Strong High
Supplier Passive Strong Low
Customer Passive Weak Low
Distributors Passive Weak Low
Public Passive Weak High
141
corporate image through environmentally friendly behavior. 
Moreover, the extra market benefits “md” will also be 
achieved through the innovative investment for eco-design 
improvement. However, a free rider producer of EPR 
program will be found guilty and receive punishment “p”, 
in accordance with the above description.
???? ????? ???????
The government players have two strategies for 
promoting the EPR program: mandatory programs, and 
voluntary programs. The former is composed of strict 
standards for recycling percentage, harmful material 
forbiddance, financial responsibilities and information 
distribution requirements; any violation of this program will 
be punished. This program is comparatively effective for 
implementing EPR. However, the government must 
effective measures in place to monitor and control the EPR 
project implementation; and besides, it should conduct a 
reasonable allocation of funds to carry out the necessary 
monitoring and regulatory. For the alternative of 
government strategy, voluntary programs initiate the 
dialogue among various stakeholders, especially the 
producers, with a voluntary agreement for the aim of toxic 
substances restriction. This initiative is the Government-to-
business based on trust arising. Government will only be 
required to pay the EPR program operating costs, such as 
publicity, thus the total expenditures can be significantly 
reduced. Nevertheless, this option is only applicable to the 
society that has a better understanding on environmental 
protection, meanwhile the leading enterprises that have a 
higher awareness of environmental situation.
On the contrary, the producer player has the following 
strategies: (1) only meet the recycling responsibility; (2) 
implement recycling and eco-design of the new product; 
and (3) free rider. For choice (1), the producer only 
considers the recycling of its end-of-life products’ collection 
and recycling, for which it needs corresponding recycling 
cost, but has potential marketing profit from the recycling 
behavior. For choice (2), the implementation for both 
recycling and eco-design will cause extra development 
expenditures besides the recycling cost, including 
environmentally friendly product development, better 
material requirement for its upstream suppliers. As reward, 
the producer may have the chance to win new markets 
share, as well as leading image for its design concept, thus 
to become more competitive. The last choice “free rider” 
will not be a wise alternative if the producer with enough 
funds for the improvement of environmental issue, 
especially under an EPR program that mandatorily carried 
out by the government. Though this passive altitude can 
avoid further cost for either recycling or eco-design inputs, 
it has the risk of punishment, as well as potential loss in 
market. According to the above analysis, a pay-off matrix 
for this game between government and producer is 
demonstrated as Table 2, where six possibilities with 
respective pay-offs is shown.
?? ???????????????????????
???? ???????????????????????
The game analysis in this paper is carried out by 
assuming the government takes “Mandatory Program” and 
“Voluntary Program” at the probabilities θ and (1 − θ) 
respectively. So that, from the producer’s viewpoint we 
have the following equations hold:
P1  = θ · (−rc + mr) + (1 − θ) · (−rc + mr)
= −rc + mr (1)
P2??= θ · (−rc − d + mr + md) + (1 − θ) · (−rc − d + mr + md)
= −rc − d + mr + md (2)
P3 = −θ · p (3)
where, P1, P2 and P3 are expected utility functions with 
respective to each strategy. By concatenating each two of 
Eq. (1) ~ Eq. (3), we can conclude that under the Mandatory 
Program, if the pure profit from the eco-design 
improvement is positive and greater than the pure profit 
from the recycling, “Recycle & Eco-design” is the best 
strategy. On the contrary, the producer would rather choose 
the “free rider” strategy, if the loss by the other two 
strategies is even worse than the punishment. Because “free 
rider” is the most undesirable strategy toward the 
government’s target, punishment should be a considerable 
value according to the minus environmental performance. 
On the other hand, in order to avoid punishment, as well as 
potential loss for strategies 1 and 2, producer should 
develop effective and efficient ways for implementing at 
least recycling. In case that the producer has the capability 
to fund new product’s development, it is wise to take 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Producers
Recycle Only Recycle & Eco-design Free Riders
G
overnm
ent
Mandatory
Program
−a − mo + er, 
−rc + mr
−a − mo + er + ed, 
−rc − d + mr + md
−a − mo + p, 
−p
Voluntary
Program
−a + er, 
−rc + mr
−a + er + ed, 
−rc − d + mr + md
−a, 
0
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strategy “Recycle & Eco-design” for promising eco-
designed product, since the ecological product will be the 
mainstream tendency for the future society.
???? ?????????????????????????????????????
Based on above analysis, four scenarios could be 
identified including: (1) P1 > 0 & P1 > P2; (2) P1 > 0 & P1 < 
P2; (3) P1 < 0 & P1 > P3; and (4) P1 < 0 & P1 < P3. These 
four scenarios’ meaning and considerations in terms of the 
practical operations in reality as well as the key influential 
factors will be further discussed below.
Scenario I: as P1 > 0 & P1 > P2, “Recycling only” will be 
the preferred strategy for producers and “Voluntary 
program” is the best choice for government. Under this 
scenario that (−rc + mr) > 0, meanwhile, (−d + md) < 0. This 
means the net profit of recycling the end-of-life products or 
the ELPs are positive but that of R&D on improving the 
recyclability of the product is negative. In this case, 
concerned producers would have higher motivation to carry 
out the collecting and recycling rather than eco-design 
improvement. Thus there is no need for government to 
carry out mandatory programs in order to solve the problem 
of ELPs. The end-of-life vehicle recycling market in US is 
a best example for this case, where the recyclers benefit 
over billion US dollars aurally even if there is no EPR 
policy at all. Meanwhile the recyclability rate of discarded 
vehicles exceeds 95%.
Scenario II: as P1 > 0 & P1 < P2, “Recycling & Eco-
design” is the preferred strategy for producers and 
“Voluntary program” is the best choice for government. 
Under this scenario, (−rc + mr) > 0, meanwhile, (−d + md) > 
0. This means, not only collecting and recycling ELPs 
business but also eco-design investment will bring the 
producers and related companies positive profits. As a 
result, enough incentives occurred to motivate the producers 
to participate in both recycling of ELPs and R&D for more 
recyclable and more environmentally friendly products in 
spite of ELPs recycling or EPR regulations. In fact, this is 
quite an ideal scenario as both economic and ecological 
needs are met in a natural way. Therefore, it is very hard to 
be realized and rarely exists. Only limited cases exist for 
this scenario. Although the situation has greatly changed 
ever since the worldwide economic crisis in 2008, the three 
automobile giants, FORD, GE and Chrysler, have 
cooperatively built a research center in Detroit to develop 
more recyclable cars as well as new recycling technologies. 
Meanwhile, FORD bought a series of recycling companies 
in Europe around the end of 20th century to extend their 
business chain from car production to cover recycling.
Scenario III: as P1 < 0 & P1 > P3, “Recycling only” will be 
the preferred strategy for producers and “Mandatory 
program” is the best choice for government. Under this 
scenario that (−rc + mr) < 0, but smaller than the 
punishment if violating the related regulations. This means 
the net profit of recycling the ELPs are negative but the 
producers will pay for even higher punishment if they failed 
to participate in recycling. In this case, problems of ELPs 
will be solved even if it is a pure cost for the producer, on 
the condition of very strict EPR regulation designs and 
implementations. The most natural EPR examples, namely 
the EC areas and Japan give the best example to this 
scenario. For example, in Sweden, there was great deal of 
used cars dumped illegally in natural forest because the 
collecting fees for discarding a used car charged to the end 
users were so high that they preferred to risk breaking the 
law. The higher collecting and disposal expenses made 
recycling a negatively costly business until EPR –based 
policies and programs came to implementation in 1990s. 
Mandatory requirements have been assigned to the end 
users to return their car to specified recyclers freely as well 
as to producers to pay for the extra cost for recycling. These 
kinds of mandatory programs achieved great success in 
Europe and Japan so that EPR attracted great attentions 
worldwide even till the time being.
Scenario IV: as P1 < 0 & P1 < P3, “Free ride” will be the 
preferred strategy for producers and neither “Mandatory 
program” nor “Voluntary program” is the best choice for 
government. Under this scenario, (−rc + mr) < 0, and bigger 
than the punishment if violating the related regulations. 
This means recycling the ELPs is purely costly for 
producers but they will pay less by violating EPR 
regulations. In other word, EPR programs will fail to be 
implemented or to be effective anyway. For example, in 
China act or proposals to implement EPR in both electronic 
and automobile industries had been enacted ever since the 
beginning of 21 century. However, related EPR regulations 
for these industries have not to be drafted yet. Reasons for 
current situation in China are quite complex. Brief factors 
will be further discussed in 5.3.
In general, the best strategy for the producers in 
scenario II is to become innovative leading company. For 
the producers in scenario I, it is actively following 
companies; for scenario III, passively following companies; 
for scenario IV, the free rider.
???? ???????????????????????????????????
Except to the net profit of recycling, R&D, and 
potential punishment for violation discussed above, there 
are more influencing factors to contribute different 
scenarios and different strategy making preferences made 
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by producers and government. These factors will be 
discussed in terms of economic performance of recycling 
ELPs, economic performance of design improvement and 
social factors as well.
As for the economic performance of recycling ELPs, it 
can be concluded from 5.2 that the better the economic 
benefits resulting from recycling ELPs are, the easier the 
implementation of EPR will be. Collecting amount and 
market for second-hand product/materials have higher 
impact on the total profit of ELPs collecting and recycling 
[11]. It can be proved by the case of the North American 
experiences that to promote the development of second-
hand product/material market is a significant factor to 
enhance the economic attractiveness of environmental 
protection programs and policies. On the other hand, it 
should not be neglected that the disposal cost is another 
important factor. For example, in the Chinese case 
mentioned above, current recycling of ELPs is actually 
quite active and profitable for a lot of small-medium-sized 
recycling companies even though these existing operations 
are very polluting. Crucial reason to this situation is that in 
China the disposal fees are quite low almost all over the 
country. The polluting profit could not be acceptable by 
Chinese government and on the other hand shows more 
difficulties rather than incentives to the producers as they 
start thinking about carrying more responsibilities of the 
used products they produced. Therefore, it proves that 
reasonable and environmentally friendly profits are 
practically significant in terms of smoothly implementing 
EPR programs.
Economic performance of design improvement for 
more recyclable products has special significance, because 
the fundamental aim of applying EPR is to solve the ELPs 
problems through an integrated life-cycle way, or in other 
word, to solve the end-of-pipe pollution from the starting 
point of production. Practical examples such as the Detroit 
R&D center mentioned above proves that economic scale 
and it’s influential power on the whole supply chain, or 
industrial concentration rate and responsible companies’ 
economic capabilities are decisive factors. Although the 
development of second-hand product market will motivate 
the development of more recyclable products, it could be 
safely concluded that EPR policies and programs itself 
might not be able to promote important eco-design 
development as expected originally when this policy was 
proposed.
Last but not least, social factors have greater 
importance especially for developing countries such as 
China. The social factors talked about here include the 
environmental protection consciousness on one hand and 
the scale of vested interest group which are inconsistent 
with ecological protection benefits. This could explain why 
almost all of the successful EPR programs exist in 
developed countries. It also gives an important insight for 
developing countries which are going to apply EPR that to 
solve important social hindering problems would be the 
first step.
In general, seven factors have key influence on the 
implementation of EPR as well as on the strategy making 
by producers, including the amount of ELPs collected, 
market for second-hand problems, waste disposal costs, 
industrial concentration rate, economic scale of responsible 
companies, social environmental protection consciousness 
and scale of vested interest group. The better the induced 
economic benefits are, the more voluntarily or the more 
easily the EPR programs will be and the more actively the 
producer will be. In this case, recycling is more preferred to 
the producers compared with other strategies. Eco-design 
improvement strategy only has limited incentives for quite 
few producers. Last but not least, social environment is the 
first hindering factor for EPR application.
?? ???????????
In this research, complicated and dynamic features of 
the life-cycle stakeholder system under EPR program is 
focused and analyzed. Adaptive management method is 
introduced to facilitate producers make adaptive strategies 
and to improve management continuously. Based on the 
study on features and interrelationships of key stakeholders, 
a game model is developed with the producer and 
government to identify the key factors for adaptive 
management. For the two key game players, voluntary and 
mandatory EPR program design are considered as strategies 
for government, and strategies are designed for the producer 
including collecting, collecting and eco-design combining 
ad free-rider. We identify the key factors in three scenarios. 
In case that during the recycling producers getting a deficit, 
which even costly than the punishment for violations; they 
are more likely to escape the desired responsibilities. As the 
recycling performance and economic system’s R&D 
capabilities for design improvement are satisfying enough 
to ensure a higher profitability, more actively responsibility 
taking in terms of recycling and design improving will be 
the optimal strategy for producers.
For producers in different countries, strategies should 
be adopted according to local conditions. Take the United 
States as an example, current environmental pressures is 
not as big as its European counterparts. “Negotiation and 
talk” is the dominant manner for environmental regulations 
making in most states. And there is favorable regulatory 
and marketing environment for end-of-life recycling 
business especially for used products. Therefore, producers 
with certain capital and technological capacities could 
actively participate in the recycling business as well as 
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“design for recycling” practices. Those with less capital or 
technological capacities could ignore the EPR requirements 
for the time being and reserve safety cash flow particularly 
during current economic crisis. Long-term R&D programs 
should be considered even more carefully.
On the contrary, in those countries with more limited 
land space, such as Europe and Japan, more urgent 
environmental protecting requirements and much stricter 
environmental regulatory systems, a more active strategy 
should be taken as priority by producers. Strategy of “free-
rider” will be considered as the last choice due to the higher 
punishment than costs required taking the responsibilities. 
Therefore, producers in Europe, Japan and other 
mandatory-preferred countries should make more efforts on 
how to reduce the recycling costs for higher economic 
profits or how to realize the regulatory recycling goals in 
more low-cost manner. Meanwhile, active publication 
should be made in order to set up a more environmentally 
friendly image, since the public in those countries are 
normally have higher environmental awareness that could 
be effectively influence their purchasing behaviors. Under 
the condition of abundant capital capacities or aggressive 
company strategy as an industrial leader, investment for 
greener and more recyclable products would be a sounder 
strategy. This could be convincingly proved by the past 
practices of the three automobile magnates in the US, 
Toyota in Japan and Shanghai GM Ltd in China.
In any case, a systematic and open management style 
is of crucial importance for the adaptive management. It is 
not only significant to pursue the learning by constantly 
understanding the life-cycle stakeholder system, but also to 
use the new knowledge to continuously adapt management 
strategies. Achievement of adaptive management needs 
both organizational and managerial reform and political and 
institutional supports. Dialogue mechanisms should be 
developed within the producer and the life-cycle 
stakeholder system. All the related stakeholders should be 
included and senior management support is required as 
well.
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